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ABSTRACT
As the threat of large-scale, conventional warfare diminishes, the
United States will increasingly find itself, and its military
forces, involved in low-intensity, insurgency, revolutionary, and
guerrilla warfare as an intervening power. One especially critical
aspect of counterinsurgency operations is the rapid and accurate
identification of insurgents and cause-sympathetic individuals.
This task is normally accomplished by an experienced and
knowledgeable expert in insurgent identifications, but appears to
be particularly well suited for the application of expert system
technology. This thesis is concerned with examining the
applicability and feasibility of using expert systems technology
for the development of a computerized screening system capable of
assisting in the identification of insurgent and cause-sympathetic
individuals in a tactical military environment.
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The aim of this thesis is to investigate the possibility
of developing a computer application capable of assisting in
the screening and identification of insurgent individuals in
a tactical military environment. This task is normally
accomplished by an expert in insurgent identifications, but
appears to be particularly well suited for the application of
expert systems technology.
Expert systems are a subspecialty of applied artificial
intelligence (AI) which have relevance for use in the military
environment. Significant advances have been made in the area
of expert systems, and numerous military applications are
expected in the near future. [Ref. 1: p.29] By definition,
expert systems ar- computer programs that derive the same or
similar conclusions and results as those of a human expert
given comparable facts and circumstances. Expert systems are
designed to solve problems, to give advice, and to provide
specific rationale for the particular decision reached.
Although several commercial examples exist, the most well
known expert systems have been limited to applications in
medical diagnosis, mineral prospecting, chemical analysis and
computer configuration. The developers of commercial expert
systems make no pretext that these systems exactly duplicate
the reasoning process that human experts commonly use in
problem solving; instead they have concentrated on achieving
results similar to those of the human expert. [Ref. 1: p. 3 6]
Not surprisingly, the majority of current expert system
applications have been confined to non-military and non-
tactical environments.
B. THESIS OBJECTIVE
The presence of insurgents is a problem with which many
governments have had or will have to contend, particularly in
undeveloped, transitional, or Third World countries. As the
Cold War ends and the Soviet-Warsaw Pact threat diminishes,
the United States will increasingly find itself, and its
military forces, involved in low-intensity, insurgency,
revolutionary, and guerrilla warfare as an intervening power.
In March 1990 the United States Marine Corps requested
that the Naval Postgraduate School initiate a preliminary
study to investigate the possibility of developing an expert
system specifically designed to aid in identifying insurgent
individuals in a tactical military environment. Due to size
and time constraints, the project has been divided into three
major areas of research. The objectives of the first phase
include background information, problem definition,
feasibility, content, and project applicability. The second
phase -f this project will include the actual development of
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a basic insurgent identification expert system prototype. The
third phase will determine the potential costs and benefits of
developing and implementing a full-scale tactical expert
system for counterinsurgency warfare.
This thesis will complete the first phase and serve as the
foundation for the development of the basic insurgency
prototype. Subsequent theses are expected to further
prototype development and analyze the costs and potential
benefits of full-scale system development and tactical
implementation. At the request of the sponsor, this thesis is
the logical continuation and modernization of a research paper
completed in 1967 by Major R. L. Simonsen, USMC. Certain
background and other applicable information from that paper is
reproduced here with the permission of the author via the
sponsoring service, and the sponsoring service.
C. THESIS PREVIEW
A brief discussion of the nature, phases, and strategies
of insurgency warfare is provided in Chapter II. Chapter III
presents a brief introduction of applied artificial
intelligence. It is followed by an overview of expert
systems. This overview includes basic discussions of problem
solving, and knowledge engineering. Chapter III also
discusses information on the various expert system types, the
framewrl' for expert systems, and the steps associated with
the c-T)Ftruction and implementation of an expert system.
3
Chapter IV is an introduction to insurgent identification
procedures and presents measurable indicators of individual
allegiance. Chapter V concludes the thesis with a brief
summary and recommendations for further research.
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II. INSURGENCY WARFARE
A. THE NATURE OF INSURGENCY
Insurgency warfare has played a major role in the military
history of the twentieth century, particularly in the Third
World. Even as the Cold War ends, it is widely believed that
economical, ethical, political, tribal, and religious
differences will continue to escalate into organized violence.
This violence will be further hampered by fierce competition
for both markets and resources in the emerging new world
economy. The United States will increasingly find itself, and
its military forces, involved in insurgency, revolutionary,
and guerrilla warfare as an intervening power. The United
States must understand the philosophy, nature, and process of
insurgency warfare if it is to successfully serve its national
interests in the Third World.
Before proceeding, the following definitions are provided
to preclude any confusion concerning the terms most often
associated with insurgency and counterinsurgency operations.
The word guerrilla is of Spanish origin, literally meaning
a "small war." A guerrillero is any person involved in waging
a small war. This use of the word guerrilla has largely been
abandonedi. Guerrilla is now used to refer to any person
engaged in the waging of a small, unconventional war.
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Guerrilla warfare is the employment of guerrillas in one
or more of three possible uses: they may be used against a
foreign invader, e.g., the Spanish irregulars and civilians
who harassed Napoleon and his troops during his attempted
expulsion of the English from Spain; they may be a weapon of
insurrection, e.g., Mao Tse-tung's conquest of China; or they
may be the agent of a foreign power, e.g., Viet Cong actions
in South Vietnam. Whatever the use of guerrillas might be,
"...guerrilla warfare is characterized by maximum
employment of deception, concealment, intelligence, and
improsation; by surprise attacks and quick withdrawals;
above all, by the avoidance of open tests of strength with
the enemy unless success is assured." [Ref. 2]
A cuerrilla movement or insurgency, regardless of its
motivation, may be defined as the effort to seize political
control of a society. It may be further defined as:
"... movement relying on the support of the people,
fighting the government administering his country for an
ideal believed not otherwise attainable; and avoiding
combat except under circumstances of his own choosing."
[Ref. 2]
An insurgency has three, four, or more stages of growth
and usually employs guerrilla warfare in but only one of these
stages. Each stage of growth has large variations in its time
schedule and in its actual makeup, not only from country to
country, but also from operational area to operational area
within a given country.
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Insurgents refers to the normally small group of
dissidents who have caused the insurgency development, i.e.,
the intelligence behind the insurgent movement. Insurgent
forces and counterinsurgent forces are sometimes used in place
of the words guerrillas and counterguerrillas, respectively.
The counterinsurgent is the government and/or intervening
power trying to defeat the insurgency and depose the
insurgents from any power they may have gained.
B. THE PHASES OF INSURGENCY
An insurgency generally begins when a group of individuals
-- the insurgents -- becomes dissatisfied with the existing
government, for one or more of any number of possible reasons,
and decides to attempt to gain control of the government and
the host society. Their organization, their operation, and
their very existence will initially be of a clandestine
nature, hidden from the government until they wish to make
their presence known. Remaining in hiding, however, means
that they will not be able to openly recruit civilians to
their cause, buy weapons, train, or do any of the other
prerequisites to waging open warfare or rebellion. In order
to compensate for this deficiency and weakness, and to shield
their covert activities from the government, they will attempt
to secretly enlist the aid of the populace and to dissociate
it from the incumbent government. If they are able to gain
7
physical control of the population and to obtain its active
support, the insurgents may be well on their way to victory.
"... in the final analysis, the exercise of political power
depends on the tacit or explicit agreement of the
population or at worst, on its submissiveness." [Ref. 3]
Insurgents require certain physical inputs from the
general population. Gueri .la forces need recruits,
information, shelter, and food, once the insurgency has
reached the guerrilla warfare phase. Before the populace can
be persuaded to supply these inputs, the insurgents must
embrace some cause that will lure people to their side of the
conflict- This cause must be plausible enough to attract
initial supporters who will be able to sway public opinion,
and bring an ever-increasing number of people into the
insurgent camp. This cause will probably be the same issue
that convinced the dissident group to attempt the overthrow of
the government in the first place, unless the dissidents are
in reality agents of a foreign power or are trying to wrest
control of the country for personal gain. Although in the
latter cases the cause may be fictitious in the eyes of the
insurgent leaders, it must nevertheless seem real and
plausible to the people.
An insurgent cause may take many forms. It may be
appealinc to the intellectuals and the proletariat in an
industrialized society, or to the peasant class in an agrarian
society: or one of independence from a colonial power. The
8
more closely the insurgent cause is allied to the religious,
social, political, and personal aspirations of the society
from which the insurgents seek support, the more support they
will be able to muster.
Once the insurgents have a plausible cause, an insurgency
usually develops according to a well-documented pattern. The
four phases of the development of an insurgency are summarized
in the following paragraphs. [Ref. 4: pp.6-56]
1. Phase I
The first phase of an insurgency begins with the
recruitment of a small band of followers, consisting of active
as well as passive -- but sympathetic -- supporters, and the
formation of a political party. These loyal supporters may
create front groups and infiltrate existing social and
political organizations. The party is usually organized with
its base in the proletariat or, in the case of underdeveloped
countries having a small or nonexistent proletariat, in the
peasant class. Once this has been accomplished, two
strategies are generally available; (1) power seizure through
legal election or appointment; (2) power seizure through armed
struggle if the first alternative fails -- as it usually does
-- on at least a nationwide basis.
2. Phase II
The second phase begins when the party leadership has
decided that the time for armed insurrection is approaching.
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Underground cells are formed, communication and supply lines
between them are established, and the weapons that will be
needed are collected and stored. Agitators and sympathetic
news media spread anti-government propaganda, and mobs and
riots discredit the government, showing sympathetic but
passive followers of the insurgent movement that resistance to
the government is possible. Persuasion, threats, and violence
are used to subvert police and government officials and to
gain control of the various towns and villages. Intelligence
nets and small armed groups are formed, and control of
villages, communities, and townships is consolidated.
3. Phase III
The third phase of an insurgency is often
characterized by guerrilla warfare, the armed insurrection by
which an ultimately successful insurgent will gain military
and political control of the majority of the land mass of the
country. During this phase, large military units are trained
and equipped, large numbers of weapons are procured, and
regular bases are acquired and established for use by the
larger, more conventional military units of Phase IV.
Because the insurgent military forces are initially
much weaker than those of the counterinsurgent, a direct
confrontation between the two would almost certainly result in
the annihilation of the insurgent. Thus, the insurgent
leaders may select as the first operating areas for the
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guerrilla bands those regions or districts of the country
where:
1. The strength of the insurgent's organization among the
population has been ensured by the preliminary work of
the party.
2. The center of the counterinsurgent power is far removed.
3. The terrain and poor government communications continue
to make them inaccessible.
4. Both sides of administrative borders are contained within
them, making it difficult for the enemy to coordinate his
reaction.
As insurgent strength increases, the movement will expand
into areas where its initial strength was small and thus
enlarge the insurgent's geographical area of control. [Ref.
3]
The objective of Phase III of an insurgency may be
summarized by the following quote from Galula.
"What makes it possible for the guerrilla to survive and
expand? The complicity of the population. This is the
key to guerrilla warfare, indeed to the insurgency. The
complicity of the population is not to be confused with
the sympathy of the population; the former is active, the
latter inactive, and the popularity of the insurgent's
cause is insufficient by itself to transform sympathy into
complicity. The participation of the population in the
conflict is obtained, above all, by the political
organization (the party) living among the population,
backed by force (the guerrilla gangs), which eliminates
the open enemies, intimidates the potential ones, and
relies on those among the population who actively support
the insurgents..." [Ref. 3]
II
Guerrilla operations will be planned primarily to obtain
support from the population and secondly to disrupt
counterinsurgency operations. An ambush against a
counterinsurgent patrol should be a military success, but more
importantly, it should bring the support of the village or
implicate the people of that village against the
counterinsurgent. In other words, attrition of the enemy is
a by-product of guerrilla warfare, not its essential goal.
[Ref. 3]
4 Phase IV
The fourth phase of an insurgency is marked by the
creation of large regular military units, capable of defeating
the counterinsurgent forces in large-scale conventional
warfare. If he has good military assets, solid political
structuring, popular mobilization in the areas of his control,
good operational subversive activities by his underground
agents in the counterinsurgent's areas, and psychological
superiority; the scope and scale of the insurgent's operations
will increase rapidly. During this phase, offensive maneuvers
will be aimed at the complete destruction of the
counterinsurgent forces.
Valeriano and Bohannan refer to this four-phase concept of
an insurgency as the Sino-Vietnamese concept and they warn
against its use as an analytical tool by the counterinsurgent
in each and every case of insurgency. Their contention is
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that the concept of operations as outlined here is the
doctrine of Chinese and Vietnamese Communist leaders and that
it is not the established or traditional guerrilla practice.
"There is, however, a course for guerrilla warfare, and
approach to successful revolution, that closely parallels
the traditional guerrilla practice. In this, the
guerrilla seeks the weaken counterguerrilla forces and the
government they support buy petty actions and petty
harassments, inducing the government to waste its strength
and lower the morale of its people by futile blows at the
guerrilla, who is not there to receive them. Meanwhile,
the guerrilla and his political leaders concentrate on
building up popular support, organized and unorganized.
At an opportune time, a quick blow, a quick ' nat i o nal
revolution' spearheaded by the guerrilla force or, as in
Russia, by political leaders, the armed forces leaderless
and the instrumentalities of government open to guerrilla
control.
"Because of the wide dissemination of the Sino-Vietnamese
concept, it appears especially important that the
intention of guerrilla forces be quickly and correctly
recognized. It is critically important that
counterguerrilla forces not be lulled by misconceptions,
that an intended national revolution not be mistaken for
the early stage of the Sino-Vietnamese pattern. If this
mistake is made, a successful revolution can occur while
counterguerrilla forces rest secure in the belief that an
attempt at overthrow is far away." [Ref. 2]
C. COUNTERINSURGENT STRATEGY
The most popular and successful counterinsurgent strategy
is characterized by a three-pronged offensive specifically
aimed at identifying and separating the insurgent from the
remaining population; defeating the insurgent militarily; and
negating or neutralizing the original insurgent cause. Each
13
of these strategic functions is briefly described in the
following paragraphs.
1. Separation of the insurgent from the remaining
population
An insurgent movement may often be defeated or
effectively neutralized by simply separating the insurgents
from the remaining population. The insurgents receive much of
their supplies and intelligence from the population in which
they operate. By separating the two, this flow of food,
weapons, ammunition, and information may be significantly
reduced or completely eliminated.
One method of separating the insurgents from the
remaining population is by governmentally imposed population
controls on travel, food, individual registration, and the
issuance of personal identification cards. Once these
controls have been enacted, the government must see that they
are enforced and remain effective. By establishing
checkpoints where identification papers and travel permits may
be inspected, and by conducting periodic searches and
interrogations of individual residents, the government may be
able to improve the effectiveness of their counterinsurgency
operations.
The forces available for the enforcement of population
control measures may be military or paramilitary units, police
units, o) a combined force of both. These forces are normally
14
referred to as screening forces regardless of their
composition. Unfortunately, the maximum force available for
screening operations is normally constrained by the size and
disposition of the total force and by other missions that may
be permanently assigned to some units. The applicability of
expert systems technology to certain screening force functions
will be discussed in Chapter IV.
2. Complete military defeat of the insurgent
The foundation of any successful counterinsurgent
strategy must be based . i the complete military defeat of the
insurgent forces. This concept was employed in World Wars I
and II with a great degree of success. There should be little
doubt that the military forces of a powerful nation could
eventually bring about such a defeat. Unfortunately, a
strategy of pure military action would provide a valuable
source of propaganda for the insurgents, and may provoke
considerable popular embitterment toward the incumbent
government and intervening power. Most importantly, the use
of military force alone does not resolve the problems relating
to the attitudes and loyalties of the general populous and the
major role they play in the overall insurgency situation. The
problem facing the counterinsurgent is not one of clearing an
area of insurgent forces, but one of persuading the civilian
population to keep their particular area clear of insurgent
15
activity- The problem has been clearly stated by Paret and
Shy:
"It is erroneous to think that military defeat pure and
simple will be the final solution. Unless the population
has been weaned away from the guerrilla and his cause,
unless reforms and re-education have attacked the
psychological base of guerrilla action, unless the
political network backing him up has been destroyed,
military defeat is only a pause and fighting can easily
erupt again." [Ref. 5]
If the insurgents are defeated militarily but retain the
support of the citizenry, the insurgents will most often
revert to the clandestine cell type operations that
characterized the first and second phases of the insurrection.
The insurgents will most likely remain in this state until a
more fa-vorable atmosphere for their operations is perceived by
the rebellion's leaders.
3. Negation or neutralization of the insurgent cause
Another essential element of any potentially
successful counterinsurgent strategy requires that the
incumbent government or counterinsurgent agent either negate
the original insurgent cause or find some way to pacify the
civilian population so that the cause loses its perceived
significance. There have been situations in which
counterinsurgents have been able to effectively adopt the
insurgents' cause as their own, thereby reducing or
eliminating popular support. Among the most notable examples
is Britain's granting of independence to Malaya. The primary
16
cause for the Malayan rebellion was to achieve independence
from restrictive British colonia± rule. When the British
promised independence in return for governmental cooperation,
however, the insurgent movement lost much of its meaning. The
war proved long and costly for both sides but the insurgents
were destined to failure after losing cause they needed to
maintain popular support.
This is not to say, however, that the negation of the
insurgent's cause will assure victory for the
counterinsurgent: it is a necessary but not sufficient
requisite for victory. Once the insurgent infrastructure is
organized and functioning, the existence of a particular cause
loses much of its relative importance. The negation of that
particular cause may make the conduct of insurgency operations
more difficult, but not impossible. It is important to
remember that the general population will continue to serve
and support what they perceive to be their own best interests.
Those individuals that were originally attracted to the side
of the insurgent by means of a particular cause or issue will
continue to maintain their complicity with the insurgent if
there is no real or perceived benefit to be gained by
switching allegiance to the government or intervening power.
It has been suggested that any successful
counterinsurgent strategy must include specific actions aimed
at influencing the general population toward more pro-
governim,)t behavior as well as operations that will defeat the
17
insurgents militarily. It is not realistic to expect that
popular attitude will be significantly changed by the work of
a dedicated counterinsurgent. Actually, increased popular
support and political loyalty for the incumbent government is
more likely to be a consequence, rather than a cause of
counterinsurgent success. The best that can be expected in
the short run of counterinsurgent effort is an influencing of
popular behavior and action so that attitudes and loyalties
can be permanently altered in the long run. If, after the
insurgent is defeated, the government works to establish and
maintain a real and lasting rapport with the people, attitudes
may begin to change and genuine political unity may be
established.
D. INSURGENCY SUMMARY
Insurgency is the attempt by a militarily inferior faction
-- the insurgents -- to usurp geo-pQ±itical control from a
military dominant faction or incumbent government. [Ref. 6:
p. 12] Insurgent movements usually develop through a well
documented four-phase growth process. The insurgent effort is
usually characterized by guerilla or unconventional warfare
tactics and population control measures.
Counterinsurgency is defined as the attempt by the
military dominant faction, incumbent government, or
governmental agent -- the counterinsurgents -- to prevent the
insurgent movement from achieving control of the geo-political
18
system. [Ref. 6: p. 12] Counterinsurgent efforts are
normally characterized by a three-pronged offensive aimed at
identifying and separating the insurgent from the remaining
population; defeating the insurgent militarily; and negating
or neutralizing the original insurgent cause.
The specific counterinsurgent task of identifying
insurgents and insurgent sympathizers is ill-structured and
normally requires considerable experience and specialized
knowledge. Because of these characteristics, tactical
insurgent identification appears to be particularly well
suited for the application of expert systems technology.
19
III. EXPERT SYSTEMS TECHNOLOGY
A. ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
Artificial Intelligence is a growing set of computer
problem-solving techniques that are developed to imitate the
human decision-making process. Marvin Minsky, Professor of
Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and
founder of the field of AI, has stated that "artificial
intelligence is the science of making machines do things that
would require intelligence if done by men." [Ref. 7: p. 4]
The field of artificial intelligence offers a distinctive
approach to complex problem solving. In conventional
computing, the programmer creates computer program
instructions that follow solution paths for each situation
presented. The solution path is planned by the programmer
using structured predictable steps, which enable the solving
of problems that require a large amount of data to be
processed. Artificial intelligence, on the other hand, uses
techniques that are helpful in solving complex problem-
symbolic processing. The symbols processed by artificial
intelligence programs represent real-world entities, and
instead of simply performing calculations, artificial
intelligence programs manipulate the relationships among the
symbols. [Ref. 8: p. 52]
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B. AN OVERVIEW OF EXPERT SYSTEMS
As a subdivision of AI, expert systems investigate methods
and techniques for the construction of man-machine systems
that have specialized decision-making expertise. Expertise
consists of knowledge about a particular domain, understanding
of the domain problem, and skills at solving problems within
the given domain. Knowledge can be gained publicly or
privately. Public knowledge includes the published
definitions, facts, and theories of which textbooks and
reference material in the discipline of study are typically
composed. Expertise usually involves much more than just
public knowledge. An expert generally possess considerable
private knowledge that has been published. This private
knowledge consists of cognition, emotion, and rules of thumb
used by the experts. The study of this private knowledge is
commonly known as heuristics. Heuristics enable the human
expert to make educated guesses when necessary, to recognize
promising approaches to problems, and to deal effectively with
incomplete or erroneous data. Elucidating and reproducing
such knowledge is the central task in constructing expert
systems. [Ref. 9: p. 41
Expert systems differ from both conventional data
processing systems and systems developed in other branches of
artificial intelligence. Expert system applications generally
involve distinguishing features, which include symbolic
representation, heuristic search, and symbolic inference.
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Expert systems also differ from the broad range of AI
applications in several other aspects. First, they emphasize
domain-specific problem solving strategies; Second, they
employ self-knowledge to reason about their own inference
processes and provide explanations or justifications for the
conclusions reached; Third, they solve problems that
generally fall into one of the following categories:
interpretation, prediction, diagnosis, debugging, design,
planning, monitoring, repair, instruction, or control. As a
result of these distinctions, expert systems represent an area
of AI research that involves paradigms, tools, and system
development strategies. [Ref. 9: p. 52]
Using the above parameters, an expert system can be
defined as a knowledge-intensive program that solves problems
that normally require a human expert. An expert system
performs many of the reasoning functions a human expert does
such as asking relevant questions and explaining its
reasoning. According to Frederick Hayes-Roth, characteristics
common to all expert systems are: [Ref. 10: p. 264]
1. They reason heuristically, using what experts consider
effective rules of thumb.
2. They interact with humans in appropriate ways, including
the use of natural languages.
3. They manipulate and reason about symbolic descriptions.
4. They function with erroneous data and uncertain
ludamental rules.
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5. They contemplate multiple competing hypothesis
simultaneously.
6. They explain why they are asking questions.
7. They justify their conclusions.
Compared to a human expert, most expert systems may appear
narrow, limited, and shallow, lacking the human expert's
experience, breadth of knowledge, and understanding of
fundamental principles. Indeed, modern expert systems
replicate the human decision-making process rather grossly.
They make major decisions by elucidating many of the relevant
criteria and by making many of the educated guesses that human
experts might make if forced to verbalize their thought
processes. Additionally, today's expert systems are limited
in their ability to learn from experience. (Ref. 10: p. 264]
C. BASIC CONCEPTS OF PROBLEM SOLVING
The basic concepts of intelligent problem-solving are
shown in Figure 1. These concepts motivate and explain the
aspects of knowledge resident in modern expert systems. The
central notion of intelligent problem-solving is that a system
must construct its solutions selectively and efficiently for
given alternatives. When the expert is resource limited, he
needs to search his alternatives in order to achieve high
performance by using knowledge acquired to effectively and
efficiently solve his problem. [Ref. 9: p. 19] In most
cases, experts face problems that are not easily formalized or
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do not have simple algorithmic solutions. It is in these
cases that heuristic methods must be used. Effective
solutions depend on the timely use of private knowledge to
identify promising alternatives, and rule-out those
alternatives that appear less promising. The first three
concepts in Figure 1 relate to the methods used by human
experts to develop the knowledge that must be resident in an
expert system. The fourth and fifth concepts aid the human
expert in developing a more efficient knowledge base, and
increase the ability of the system to solve more difficult
problems.
D. KNOWLEDGE ENGINEERING
Knowledge engineering is the term that has been adopted by
researchers for the discipline of formulating knowledge in
expert systems. The burden of uncovering and formalizing the
human expert's knowledge is incumbent upon the knowledge
engineer. Through an extended series of interactions with an
expert, the knowledge engineer should be able to define the
problems to be attacked, discover the basic concepts involved,
and develop rules that express the relationships that exist
between these basic concepts. Knowledge engineering combines
scientific, technological, and social methodology elements.
One of the fundamental principles of knowledge engineering is
that expert performance rarely conforms to an algorithmic
process As stated earlier, expert performance is often
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1. Knowledge = Facts + beliefs + heuristics
2. Success = Finding answer with resources available
3. Search efficiency directly effects success
4. Aids to efficiency:
a. applicable and discriminating knowledge
b. rapid elimination of "blind alleys"
c. elimination of redundant computation
d. increased speed of computer operation
e. cooperative sources of knowledge
f. reasoning of abstractions
5. Sources of increased problem difficulty:
a. erroneous data or knowledge
b. dynamically changing data
c. number of possibilities to evaluate
d. complex procedures or possibilities
FIGURE 1: Basic Concepts of Problem Solving
tempered by private knowledge or heuristics, and empirical or
causal factors. The essential tasks of knowledge engineering,
therefore, include extracting, articulating, and computerizing
as much )f the human expert's private knowledge as possible.
Finally, knowledge engineering addresses the problem of
developi,)gc and buildina skilled computer systems which first
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extract the experts knowledge, then organize it in to an
effective implementation. [Ref. 9: p. 13]
E. EXPERT SYSTEM TYPES
Most expert systems are classified as one of several
different types. Classifications and distinctions are usually
made and justified according to the system's primary function
or intended mission. Each of the major system types are
defined and briefly discussed below.
1. Interpretation Systems
Interpretation systems infer situation descriptions
from observations, which includes surveillance, speech
understanding, image analysis, chemical structure elucidation,
signal interpretation, and different types of intelligence
analysis. An interpretation system explains stochastic data
by assigning symbolic meanings describing the situation or
system accounting for the data. Interpretation systems appear
well suited for many military applications. In the
counterinsurgency arena, interpretation systems may be used
for threat and tactical intelligence analysis, surveillance
programs, and foreign language translation.
2. Control Systems
An expert control system adaptively governs the
overall behavior of a particular system. In order to
accomplish this, a control system must repeatedly interpret
the curi'ent situation, predict the future, diagnose the causes
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of anticipated problems, formulate a remedial plan, and
monitor its execution to ensure success has been achieved.
Control system applications include air traffic control,
business management, mission control and battlefield
management. Control systems are extensively utilized in most
weapon navigation systems, tactical aircraft systems, and
ground combat vehicle systems. Adaptations of control systems
for counterinsurgency operations might include intelligence
monitoring systems, communication and message routing systems,
and specific scenario exploration or wargamming applications.
3. Diagnostic Systems
Diagnostic systems infer system malfunctions from
observable values. This category includes medical,
electronic, mechanical, and software diagnosis. Diagnosis
systems typically relate observed behavioral irregularities
with underlying causes using one of two techniques. The first
method uses a table of associations between behaviors and
diagnoses. The second method combines knowledge of system
design with knowledge of potential flaws in design,
implementation, or components which generate candidate
malfunctions that are consistent with the observations.
Diagnostic systems are normally utilized by the military in
various mechanical, electrical, and medical applications.
Their direct application to the counterinsurgency scenario has
yet to b) determined.
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4. Design Systems
Design systems construct descriptions of objects that
will satisfy the constraints of the specified design problem.
Such problems include circuit layout, building design, and
budgeting. Design systems construct descriptions of objects
that are in various relationship with one another and that
verify that the configurations conform to stated constraints.
The direct relevance and application of design system
technology to counterinsurgency operations has yet to be
determined.
5. Planning Systems
Planning systi.ns design actions. These type of
systems speciali- - in problems of design concerned with
objects that perform functions. They include automatic
programming as well as robot, project, route, communication,
and mi±itary planning problems. At this time, most military
planning system research and development is being limited to
the strategic level and certain wargamming applications. At
the tactical or counterinsurgency operations level, planning
systems may have future relevance to the conduct of
operations, route selection, and communication or control
systems.
6. Monitoring Systems
Monitoring systems compare observations of system
behavior to features that are crucial to successful plan
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outcomes. These crucial features correspond to potential
flaws that may be present in the plan. Generally, monitoring
systems identify vulnerabilities in two ways. The first type
of vulnerability corresponds to an assumed condition whose
violation would nullify the plan's rationale. The second type
of vulnerability arises when some potential effect of the plan
violates a specified planning constraint. Many computer-aided
monitoring systems exist for nuclear power plants, air
traffic, disease, and regulatory fiscal management tasks.
Although indirect, monitoring systems may have a significant
and positive affect on the various levels of counterinsurgency
operations. Many monitoring systems are utilized for military
weapon guidance and deployment systems, tactical air traffic
control systems, and combat field medical service systems.
7. Repair Systems
Repair systems develop and execute plans that
administer a corrective action for diagnosed problems. Most
of these systems incorporate debugging, planning, and
execution capabilities. Computer-aided repair systems are
occurring in the domains of automotive, network, avionic, and
computer maintenance. Although extremely important for many
other military applications, the benefit and advantage of
repair system utilization in the counterinsurgency scenario
has yet to be determined.
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8. Instruction Systems
Instruction systems debug and diagnose behaviors.
They incorporate diagnosis and debugging subsystems that
specifically address certain problems. These systems begin by
constructing a hypothetical description of the knowledge
pertaining to the problem, then diagnose weakness in the
knowledge and identify an appropriate remedy. Instruction
system technology is used extensively by the military for the
construction of various education and qualification systems.
Instruction systems may be specifically applicable to the
conduct of counterinsurgency operations as foreign language
tutors; scenario exploration and wargamming programs; and
weapon system training, qualification, and support systems.
9. Prediction Systems
The last type of expert system are known as prediction
systems. Prediction systems infer likely consequences from
given situations or input conditions. This category includes
weather forecasting, demographic predictions, traffic
predictions, crop estimations, and military forecasting. A
prediction system typically employs a parametric dynamic model
with parameter values that are fitted to the given situation.
The counterinsurgency screening and identification system to
be investigated by this thesis will be classified as a
predictin system, and directly supports the extensive
applicability of this type of system for counterinsurgency
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operations. Other potential prediction system applications in
the counterinsurgency scenario might include demographic
forecasts; tactical and strategic operations models; force
movement predictions; and insurgency support, strength, and
growth estimates. [Ref. 9: pp. 13-16]
F. A FRAMEWORK FOR EXPERT SYSTEMS
One of the most important aspects of an expert system is
that it can make decisions or help people make decisions.
Using this basic capability, the essential framework behind
expert system can be illustrated. One of the characteristics
of an expert system is the emphasis on qualitative logical
reasoninQ, vice quantitative calculations. Logical inference
uses logical data, and consequently, the database of an expert
system may or may not contain numerical data. The logical
data in an expert system is commonly known as the knowledge
base.
A key feature of a knowledge base is that its contents are
not necessarily abstract symbols like numbers or conditional
probabilities. Another important characteristic of a
knowledge base is the body of facts which represent the way in
which concepts are related to each other. In expert systems,
meanings are explicitly represented by recording relationships
in a form that the comptter can exploit, and not by reducing
data tn abstract quantities. [Ref. 11: p. 129]
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The most primitive element shared by computer programs is
the symbol. Symbols are simply character strings which stand
for or suggest something by reason of relationship,
association, convention or accidental resemblance When
elements are progressively added, the ability of these symbols
becomes richer and much more useful. After the descriptions
and relationships have been instantiated, the rules of the
knowledge base are constructed. Given data, the rules should
be capable of making inferences via some type of control
process- A skillful decision maker does not apply rules
blindly to a situation, but rather in a controlled manner, and
an expert system must be similarly controlled. The inference
engine of a knowledge based decision process usually provides
this control.
The inference engine in a knowledge based system uses
information presented in the knowledge base to infer
conclusions. The inference engine interprets the rules in the
base in conjunction with the control options in order to infer
solutions to consultations. There are two main ways in which
inference engines control the use of knowledge in solving
problems- In the 'data-driven' (forward-chaining) method the
inference engine examines the data that is available and
applies all the rules which are satisfied to derive the new
data. The conclusions which are made contribute to the body
of data and may in turn allow other rules to operate. This
cycle may be repeated many times until a diagnosis is reached
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or a recommendation is concluded. The second method, the
'goal-driven' (backward-chaining) approach begins at the
opposite end of the logical process. The goal-driven approach
identifies the conclusions that it needs to establish its
goals, and then examines the rules to see which ones
contribute to these goals. The next step is to look at the
"If..." part of the "If... Then" rules and locate any missing
data that may be needed to reach the conclusions. Missing
data is then filled in as new 'subgoals' or through an
interactive process with the user. As with the data-driven
method, the cycle may be repeated many times, and it may
require many generations of subgoals before the expert system
is able to obtain all the necessary data to achieve a
conclusion. The power of any particular expert system comes
from the quality and comprehensiveness of its knowledge base,
and not from the sophisticated features of the system. [Ref.
11: p. 131]
G. STEPS IN CONSTRUCTING AN EXPERT SYSTEM
The development and implementation of an expert system
requires careful planning and a thorough understanding of the
decision making process that is being duplicated. Expert
system development requires a well planned and flexible design
strategy- The phases involved in constructing an expert
system are:
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1. Determine task suitability for expert system technology.
2. Knowledge acquisition.
3. Implementation stage.
4. Initial system design.
5. Building a prototype system.
6. Analysis, redesign, and fine tuning.
7. Periodic system maintenance.
1. Determiune task suitability for expert system
technology
One of the major reasons for the development of expert
systems was for applications and soluticns to problems with
situations where a programming algorithm would not be
practical. An analysis of the task to be performed should be
accomplished to ensure that the expert systems approach is the
best and most practical way to address the problem, or perhaps
the problem is best suited for some other type of programming
technique.
There are several characteristics that are commonly
associated with the use of expert system technology:
a. Tasks which involve knowledge that can be expressed as
"rules of thumb."
b. Problems which human experts usually perform.
c. Tasks which involve knowledge that is rapidly changing.
d. Tasks which do not rely heavily on "common sense."
e. Tasks which involve inexact reasoning.
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f. Tasks that can be represented as a set of independent
actions or conditions.
Other factors that should be considered include the
amount of time needed to create the expert system and the
financial costs associated with actual system development and
implementation.
2. Knowledge acquisition
The knowledge acquisition phase involves the gathering
of information and formalization of data that will be
necessary to develop the expert system. Knowledge acquisition
includes the identification of all parameters, including
participants, problem characteristics, resources, and goals
which are associated with the tasks or problems under
consideration. During this phase, the major components of the
reasoning process and identification of the elements that
should be included in the expert system are determined.
Refinement of the acquired knowledge and organization
of key elements has to be accomplished before any further
system development. Analysis of the interrelationships of the
knowledge elements and reasoning paths should be noted and
identified. Instances where two or more reasoning paths make
use of the same information, identification of how these
reasonina paths are related should documented. This will
allow the developers of the expert system to continually
refine the knowledge acquired and help eliminate unnecessary
35
or redundant information. The concepts and relations that are
identified in the first phase are analyzed and made explicit
during this phase. This analysis of the knowledge should be
completed to a level where it can be organized into a
framework or representation of the information. It is this
framework that will be used to develop the prototype system.
3. Implementation stage
Implementation involves the mapping of the formalized
knowledge into the represented framework associated with the
tools to solve the problem. As the knowledge in this
framework is made compatible, consistent and organized, the
framework7 becomes an executable program. The knowledge
engineer then evolves a useful representative for the
knowledge collected and will use it to develop a prototype
expert system. The development of the prototype system is an
extremely important step in the construction of an expert
system. The prototype knowledge base is implemented by using
the knowledge engineering aids available and chosen for
development of the program. The formalization involves
mapping the key concepts, subproblems, and information flow
characteristics that harve been isolated during the knowledge
acquisition phase, into formal representations based upon
knowledqe engineering tools or frameworks. The design should
reflect the most efficient manner in which to represent the
acquired knowledge.
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4. Initial system design
This next phase involves the organization of
information acquired during the knowledge acquisition phase
and modelled in the implementation stage, into a form that
will be usable by the expert system. The overall purpose of
the expert system should be kept in mind when designing the
system. The design should continue to reflect the most
efficient manner in which to represent the acquired knowledge,
and should also provide a user interface that will be
appropriate for users who may not fully understand expert
systems. In system design, representation of the knowledge
needs to be understood, and a determination needs to be made
as to the best way to represent the knowledge that will be
used by the system. The expert system makes use of a taxonomy
file and a rule base file to store the knowledge that has been
acquired and refined by the experts.
5. Build a prototype system
After the initial system design has been finalized,
the next phase is to build a prototype of the expert system.
This phase incorporates the following steps:
1. The initial taxonomy and rules are constructed.
2. Production of an interpreter that incorporates the
elements of the taxonomy.
3. Validity of the taxonomy and rule base is tested through
the use of expert system predicates.
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The development of the prototype system should be
accomplished incrementally. Small versions of the rule base
file and the taxonomy file should be coded and tested. Once
these initial rules and taxonomies have been tested then
further construction of these two files can be accomplished
and incorporated with the original files. The finished
prototype should be a complete working system. From this
working prototype, the human expert should be able to
determine if the expert system is functioning as expected when
presented with circumstances from within the specified problem
domain.
6. Analysis, redesign, and fine tuning
The prototype system that has been developed should be
tested extensively by the experts who provided the knowledge.
These experts are best qualified to determine if the
conclusions generated by the expert system are valid. They
can provide information previously overlooked and recommend
changes and improvements to the system. Test examples should
be of a magnitude that they determine the weaknesses of the
system, knowledge base, and inference structure. The elements
that notmally cause poor performance are input/output
characteristics, control strategies, inference rules, and the
test examples used on the system. Through this analysis and
redesign phase, areas may be discovered by the experts where
there needs to be further explanation given for the actions
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taken by the system in reaching a conclusion. The search
paths used and reported by the expert system should be checked
to ensure they are both reasonable and valid. Through this
analysis process, any changes that need to be made by the
expert system can be identified. Once analysis of the system
has been completed, designers can continue to modify and
improve the system prototype based upon the findings of system
analysis.
After the initial analysis has been accomplished and
the re,-'ommended changes have been incorporated into the
initial design, the system should be ready for final testing
and evaluation. It is recommended that the same individuals
who tested the initial system also test the revised or final
system.
7. Periodic system maintenance
Expert systems are often used for tasks in which the
input information regularly changed, updated, or revised.
Whenever this occurs, the system may need to be analyzed and
tested to see if the conclusions generated by the expert
system are still valid and best for the situation. Updating
and additional system development is preferably accomplished
by those persons who did the knowledge acquisition, in order
to maintain system organization and systematic programming.
Attempting to replicate expert decision-making with a
compute,- requires a well and carefully planned design
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strategy. The construction of an expert system from the
initial design to a working system roughly follows the above
defined steps. Development of a full-scale expert system
requires extensive analysis, redesign, and testing of system
concepts, elements, and reasoning processes. Numerous
reworkings may be required before an accepted performance
level is achieved.
H. EXPERT SYSTEMS SUMMARY
Expert systems investigate methods and techniques for the
construction of man-machine systems that have a degree of
specialized decision-making expertise. Expertise consists of
knowledge about a particular domain, understanding of a domain
problem, and skills at solving the problem within the
specified domain. The formulation of knowledge in an expert
system is accomplished by the knowledge engineer who gathers
knowledge from public and private sources on a particular
subject. This knowledge is then used to develop the basic
concepts to be used in an expert system. Identification of
relationships that exist between the basic concepts leads to
the formulation of a rule base. The construction of an expert
system prototype then enables the expert to evaluate rule base
design and system execution. Final development of a full-
scale expert system requires extensive analysis, redesign,
testina, and evaluation.
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Following the methods and techniques described in this
chapter, knowledge engineers and system developers may begin
to construct a prototype expert system capable of assisting
with the identification of insurgent individuals. Prior to
this initial system development, however, the knowledge
engineer must fully understand the current insurgent
identification process and the applicable and measurable
indicators of popular support.
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IV. INSURGENT IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURES
A. SCREENING FORCE FUNCTIONS
During the conduct of counterinsurgency operations,
screening forces are primarily utilized for population
surveillance and control missions. As described in Chapter
II, these forces may consist of military or paramilitary
units, police units, or any combination of these forces. An
extremely important secondary mission often assigned to the
screeninq force is the interrogation and detention of
suspected insurgent and cause-sympathetic individuals.
Unfortunately, screening forces are not formally trained or
qualified to definitively identify insurgents and insurgent
sympathizers. This task is normally accomplished by an expert
or specialist in insurgent identifications temporarily
assigned to or requested by the screening force commander. A
diagram depicting how a computerized expert system might
assist in identifying insurgent and cause-sympathetic
individuals is included as Figure 2. As indicated in the
diagram, the actual identification of suspected individuals as
a probable insurgent or insurgent sympathizer is normally
based on available personal data, known political
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affiliations, crime statistics, and a personal interview to





FIGURE 2: Proposed Identification Expert System
B. ALLEGIANCE
The concepts of allegiance, loyalty, and patriotism are
not interpreted in the same way by all nations or peoples. It
would, fnr example, be extremely difficult to measure the
governmental allegiance of a transitional country using
measu- . relevant to the, concept of patriotism in the United
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States. It would perhaps be more appropriate to measure a
population's or individual's willingness to cooperate with
their government, to heed governmental advice, and to accept
and participate in various governmental programs.
In attempting to capture the "hearts and minds" of the
people whose country is torn by an insurgency, we must be
realistic as to the extent to which this is possible. It is
quite probable that the Western concept of allegiance will
need to bp tempered during the initial phases of
counterinsurgency operations. Counterinsurgent forces should,
at least initially, be satisfied with something less than
complete "Western allegiance" from the insurgency-wracked
civilian population. It is anticipated that as the
insurgents' influence among the populace diminishes, the
people will begin to identify with their government, and a
true attitude of allegiance and cooperation will begin to
develop.
C. ALLEGIANCE INDICATORS TO BE MEASURED
During the Viet Nam era there were many attempts to
identify the indicators of popular support that comprise the
overall control of the people by an insurgency movement. In
1966, S. N. Bjelajac compiled what most officials consider the
most extensive and detailed list. [Ref. 13] Bjelajac
identified eleven interactive guidelines that collectively
represen'. a comprehensive measurement of the overall control
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and influence enjoyed by the insurgent. These guidelines are
also relevant measures of an individual's identification with
and sympathy for the insurgency movement. N'' - . these
guidelines will be discussed below, along with some sample
questions which give an idea of the type e might be
incorporated into an expert system designed to measure the
allegiance of an individual residirg in an insurgency-torn
country. A much more comprehensive list of questions is
include<d as Appendix A. The remaining two guidelines outlined
by Bjelajac are primarily concerned with security measures and
are considered beyond the scope of this thesis.
In the following discussion, all quotations are taken from
Bjelajac's thesis. [Ref. 13] Bjelajac's guidelines and
statements will be used to formulate questions for possible
inclusion in the proposed counterinsurgency expert system.
1. Political Control
Bjelajac states "the degree of political control
exercised over the administrative subdivisions of a given area
can be measured in terms of control of the many individual
institutions by which political and governmental activities
are manifested."
In order to make the counterinsurgency system useful,
it will Ye necessary to avoid questions that are too general
in natur-. Care must also be taken to tailor the specific
questin to the individual being interviewed or interrogated.
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While support of the government's counterinsurgency programs
by the community council or elders is important, it is not a
measure of governmental acceptance by any particular
individual. Examples of questions tailored for and directed
at an individual might include:
a. If you were offered a position of responsibility in your
community, would you unhesitatingly accept?
b. Would you be willing to serve on the police force of your
community?
c. Would you consider becoming a candidate in a local
political election?
Although these questions do not directly measure loyalty,
they may demonstrate an individual's belief in the
government's security programs. They may also serve to
illuminate an individual's perception of continued safety or
relative security in a particular geographical location. It
is believed that these questions will have merit in their
proposed task, especially when considered in conjunction with
the other questions in the expert system.
2. Control of Intelligence
"The pattern of the flow of intelligence is an excellent
general barometer of progress in
insurgency/counterinsurgency. The details of this pattern
must be analyzed systematically, for the conclusions to be
drawn vary widely with such factors as the quantity and
quality of intelligence, its subject orientation, its
method of acquisition, and its sources."
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The source of intelligence information is a very
significant indicator of counterinsurgent progress. For
example, intelligence information volunteered by the local or
general population may indicate a willingness to support or
cooperate with the government or pro-government forces.
Specific questions aimed at determining source-intelligence
information might include:
a. If you knew of something the insurgents were doing or
were planning to do that was detrimental to
counterinsurgent forces, would you report it to your
local government officials?
b. If you knew of an ambush or attack planned by the
insurgents, would you warn the government forces?
Also significant is the type and amount of information
that is -olunteered. We would expect that an individual who
is completely pro-government would volunteer all types of
information about insurgent activities and, in particular,
information concerning operations within or near his
community. In this regard, another helpful question might be:
C. If you knew that a member of your village or someone
living within your community were working for the
insiirgents, would you report him to the government?
The scope of government intelligence coverage is also
very important but not as easy to measure. Data on the
endurance of government intelligence nets in enemy controlled
areas may well have to be garnered by evaluation of local area
advisor- One measure -,f the scope of intelligence might be
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the willingness of individuals to risk reporting minor as well
as major insurgent plans and activities. It is conceivable
that an individual would risk insurgent reprisal to report
known plans of a major insurgent operations, but that they
would be less eager to risk themselves to report plans of
comparatively minor activities.
3. Public Opinion and Propaganda
"Popular allegiance and support - not geographic areas
under control - are the ultimate measures of success for
either side. When attitudes need to be changed, the
professional propagandist normally bases his appeals both
on sentiment and logic. Each of these are in themselves
composed of many factors. Either may predominate;
howevei, more often appeals to sentiment carry the greater
weight"
There are several approaches to estimating the extent
to which the insurgents or the counterinsurgents are
successful in disseminating their information policies and the
degree to which these disseminations appear to influence
public opinion. Unfortunately, many are of the type that
cannot be investigated by questioning or polling individuals.
The extent to which the press and other public media
contribute voluntary government support and the amount of
influence the government is able to exert over non-
governmental public and private organizations are two
examples. Individual responses to the use of government-
oriente1 news and propaganda media could prove useful, as well
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as an individual's attendance at pro-government meetings and
rallies- Possible system questions might include:
a. Would you rather read an insurgent news publication or a
government news publication?
b. Which newspaper do you believe contains the most accurate
and complete information?
c. Would you be willing to attend a pro-insurgent meeting or
rally?
4. Political Aspects of Education
"The term political aspects of education is, for the sake
of this discussion, intended to embrace those aspects of
ideoloqical indoctrination carried out within the
institutional framework of the public educational system."
Once again, there are many areas of educational
concern that may not be measurable by individual responses.
These factors might include the number of schools active
within the education system, the overall attendance rate, the
competence of the teachers, general curriculums, etc. While
these factors provide important information by themselves,
they are perhaps most useful when considered in relation to an
individual's response to specific questions about his own
educational beliefs and practices.
The willingness of an individual to send his children
to a gov-ernment school; the willingness of an individual to
aid in the re-establishment of the government school system in
the event of military, guerrilla, or terrorist disruption; and
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an individual's support for pro-government teachers are all
direct indicators of a pro-government ideology. Specific
questions directed at an individual's educational beliefs and
practices might include:
a. Are you in favor of the government sponsored educational
system?
b. Are you against paying taxes to help fund the government
educational system?
c. Would you volunteer to help teach or tutor at an
insurgent sponsored school?
5. Control of the Legal System
Bjelajac states that there must be "...respect for
the courts, laws, and other legal instruments of government by
the public, as opposed to acquiescence to insurgent attempts
to establish their own shadow government."
This may be measured in part by the willingness of the
people to resolve any legal disputes they may have through
the community, district, or province legal processes.
As in all areas dealing with human emotions and
opinions, indiv 'ual perception is of prime importance.
Stated differently, no matter how effective government legal
agencies, unless the people believe they are being equally and
fairly protected by the law, attempts to alter public opinion
from pro-insurgent tC pro-counterinsurgent will prove
unsuccessful. Therefore, sample questions for our expert
system might include:
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a. Do you believe government supporters and sympathizers are
adequately protected by the legal system?
b. Do you believe the government laws are fair and just for
all people?
c. Do you agree with the government policy of severe
punishment for those convicted of political, economic, or
other crimes against the security of the country?
Also important is the trend of popular opinion over
time; the changing of public opinion from anti-government to
pro-government. Trend analysis questions should probably be
incorporated into each of the "interactive guidelines" when
the actual expert system is developed and ultimately
implemented.
6. Community Services and Civic Action
The question of who effectively controls civic
functions in an area and thereby plays the role of social
reformer is in itself one indicator of the trend of political
control within a particular area. Each area must, of course,
be evaluated in the light of its actual political,
psychological, and military situation, taking into account the
fact that some areas are of greater strategic importance than
others. Political trends within the country as a whole may be
derived from a careful and weighted analysis of such trends
within individual areas.
We cannot say that merely doing what we perceive to be
the best for the people will constitute an adequate civic
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action program. Here again, it is of paramount importance to
consider not only our own perceptions, but also the
perceptions of the general population. An extensive post-high
school educational system or highway road system is extremely
important in modern Western civilizations. The population of
an insurgency-torn country, however, may not favor the
intrusion. Expert system questions, therefore, should pertain
to an individual's opinion as to whom is responsible for the
development, construction, and maintenance of state and
community services. Poosible queries might include:
a. Do you believe government taxes are fair and necessary?
b. Would you volunteer to be a government sponsored
policeman or fireman in your community?
c. Would you be willing to work for the public good in your
community?
In Vietnam, Revolutionary Development Teams were
continually harassed and attacked by the Viet Cong. It is
believed that repeated attacks by insurgents on any government
program may be taken as a direct indication of the success of
that particular program. An individual's or community's
willinaness to help rebuild the accomplishments of the program
after an insurgent attack would seem to reflect a belief in
the program and in the program's sponsor. Recognizing this,
another potential question might be:
d. Wculd you voluntarily help rebuild a government hospital
that was destroyed or damaged by the insurgents?
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7. Control of Transportation and Communications
The control of transportation and communications is a
larger and more general type of measurement. It is not
directly relatable to individual interrogation. However, an
individual might be asked about his trepidation, or lack of
it, in travelling the public roads of the country. Also, his
willingness to work in or become part of a government warning
net would be a positive indication of government support. As
with other categories, the voluntary reporting of insurgent
activities to government forces is indicative of government
progress in the area. Possible questions within this topic
area might include:
a. Would you lead government forces down roads, trails, and
paths in your community's area?
b. Do you believe the government keeps the roads and
waterways safe in your area?
c. Would you volunteer to help build or maintain a
government sponsored road project?
8. Control of Recruitment
The ability to gain voluntary recruits is extremely
beneficial for both insurgent and government forces. On the
other hand, the necessity to use political controls or other
coercive forms of persuasion or social pressures to gain
necessary recruits is extremely negative. The positive
involvement of a potential recruit's family is also considered
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a favorable factor. Therefore, the expert system may pose
questions on the willingness of a parent to allow his/her son
to enlist or become part of the government's military or
police forces. Obviously, the willingness of the individual
to become or allow his/her dependents to become members of the
insurgent infrastructure is a negative indicator. Possible
questions might include:
a. Would you be unhappy if your son enlisted in the
insurgent armed forces?
b. Would you be proud of a son in the government's armed
forces?
c. Would you be willing to fight or even die for government
preservation?
9. Economic Controls
The relative ease of collecting taxes from the
populace is an important measure of pro-government attitudes,
while increasing difficulty in tax collection becomes a
measure of escalating pro-insurgent feelings. Potential
questions might include:
a. Are you angered by the need and the amount of taxes you
pay the government?
b. Do you think you should pay taxes to the insurgents?
c. Do you believe the insurgents would take their taxes by
force or coercion?
Without a strong sense of allegiance to the
governmeTnt, it is reasonable to expect an individual to sell
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his agricultural produce to the highest bidder in an open
market. Thus, another question might ask:
d. Given equal prices, would you rather sell you goods to
the insurgents or to the government?
D. AN ALLEGIANCE TESTING METHOD
It appears that a method whereby the people of an
insurgency wracked country are used to evaluate their own
attitude would be of great value in developing an expert
system capable of assisting in insurgent identification. It
is believed that the key to an accurate measure lies with the
people themselves who seem to be an obvious source for answers
to the problem of measuring loyalty and allegiance. This is
not to say that direct questioning of individuals about their
loyalties would necessarily yield useful information. There
is the possibility that the answers to such questions would be
what the individual - if he understood the question to begin
with - thought his interrogator wanted to hear rather that
what he actually felt. In spite of this possible detriment,
the use of the people to evaluate their own attitudes is
worthy of our consideration.
Because opinion symbolizes attitude, the proposed expert
system should solicit an individual's opinions as the means
for measuring his loyalty attitude. In this case, the
statemen or opinion is referred to as the objective index
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while the inferred subjective inclination of the person being
examined is called a specific attitude variable. It is
obvious that some discrepancy exists between an individual's
opinions and his overt acts, which we should use here as an
index, and the true attitude which we infer from such an
index. Every time we measure something however, we postulate
an abstract continuum, such as height or weight, and the thing
measured is referenced to that continuum through one or more
indices. The actual values of what we are trying to measure
are inferred from the relative consistency of the indices,
since we never know the values exactly. For many years,
psychologists have attempted to use attitude scales to measure
many intangible aspects of human behavior. For our purposes,
the method of summated ratings is most applicable.
The method of summated ratings presumes that the
statements or questions can be accurately divided into two
classes, favorable and unfavorable. Individual subjects are
then directed to separate the statements into five categories;
strongly disagree, disagree, undecided, agree, strongly agree.
Each of these categories may have a corresponding numerical
value from one to five that will allow the system to identify
those individual's with cumulative scores below an acceptable,
pre-determined level. As stated earlier, the method of
summated ratings also affords the system the capability of
phrasing questions and statements either negatively or
positi7-ly. For example, a 'strongly agree' rating to an
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unfavorable statement would result in a zero score, as would
a 'stronqly disagree' rating to a favorable statement.
Finally, in this method of psychological testing, it is
the local population who could actually determine the
acceptable scale values to be used in the system, resulting in
a 'relative scale' for use within that group or community
only. This relativity may be best accomplished via
traditional interviews and close associations with known
governmental or counterinsurgent force supporters from the
local community.
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V. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMqNDATIONS
A. SUMMARY
The primary goal of this thesis was to investigate the
feasibility and applicability of expert systems technology to
certain aspects of counterinsurgency operations in a tactical
military environment. Particular emphasis was placed on a
possible expert system contribution to the formidable
counterinsurgency screening force function of identifying
insurgent and cause-sympathetic individuals. The effort to
automate this function has the potential to significantly
improve both the effectiveness and efficiency of the
counterinsurgency screening force.
Chapter II presented a necessary introduction to the
nature, phases, and strategies of insurgency warfare. Chapter
III briefly discussed applied artificial intelligence and
presented each of the major expert system types with specific
focus on their current or potential contribution to
counterinsurgency operations. Most importantly, Chapter III
presentei the steps required to construct an expert system
capable of aiding the screening force in identifying inL'-rgent
and causc-sympathetic individuals. Chapter IV discussed the
current counterinsurgency screening force individual
identific:ation process and suggested a method of optimizing
58
this process via the application of expert systems technology.
Finally, Chapter IV presented specific, measurable indicators
of individual allegiance. These indicators are based on
eleven interactive psychological guidelines identified by S.
N. Bjelajac in 1966. Bjelajac's guidelines provide the basis
for questions formulated for possible inclusion in the
insurgent identification expert system under investigation.
These potential questions are included in Chapter IV and
Appendix A.
B. CONCLUSIONS
This thesis provides a foundation and basis for further
research and development in the application of expert systems
technology to the counterinsurgency scenario of tactical
military operations. Further research and the actual
development of an expert system prototype capable of aiding in
the identification of insurgent and cause-sympathetic
individuals are expected to provide significant improvements
in the conduct of counterinsurgency operations.
C. AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
As stated earlier, this thesis represents the first phase
of a three phase project to investigate the feasibility and
applicability of expert systems technology to the insurgent
and cause-sympathetic identification process of
counterinsurgency operations in a tactical military
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environment. The second phase is expected to further research
and provide for the development of a basic insurgent
identification expert system prototype. The third phase of
this project will finalize prototype development and explore
the potential costs and benefits associated with developing
and implementing a full-scale tactical expert system for
counterinsurgency warfare.
Once the final prototype system has been developed,
research attention can be focused on three distinct areas:
(1) training and tutoring of inexperienced screening force
personnel, (2) incorporation of external data sources with the
expert system prototype, and (3) expanding expert system
technology to other areas of counterinsurgency and tactical
military operations.
1. Training and tutoring
with further research and development, variations of
the expert iystem prototype to be developed during the second
phase of this project could be used for instructional and
training purposes by screening force personnel. The detail,
rationale, and feedback ability of expert systems could
enhance the screening force personnel's ability to recognize,
interpret, and analyze the tremendous amount of information
associated with the identificat' Dn of insurgent and cause-
sympathetic individuals.
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2 Incorporation of external data sources
Aj extremely important area for further research would
be to examine the feasibility and practicality of interfacing
the insurgent identification expert system prototype with
existing international and national police, driving,
financial, birth registration, voting, and various other
archived information data sources. Access to this amount and
type of information would significantly enhance the ability of
the prototype system to make and justify individual allegiance
determinations. Additionally, successful research in this
area would increase the credibility of utilizing expert
systems in tactical military operations.
3. System expansion
The task considered by this thesis and the overall
project has been limited to the identification of insurgent
and cause-sympathetic individuals during counterinsurgency
operations in a tactical military environment. Subsequent
research should expand the use of expert systems technology to
other counterinsurgency scenarios, and other tactical military




SAMPLE QUESTIONS FOR POSSIBLE INCLUSION IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF
AN EXPERT SYSTEM CAPABLE OF AIDING IN THE SCREENING AND
IDENTIFICATION OF INSURGENT INDIVIDUALS
The following are questions for possible inclusion in the
proposed insurgent screening and identification expert system.
This set of sample questions is provided for illustrative
purposes only, and should by no means be considered
exhaustive. It should also be emphasized that these questions
are furnished as simple examples, and in many cases would
require additional thought and effort as to type and format.
For the construction of the actual system, statement and
question formulation should be assigned to experienced
counterinsurgency interrogation specialists and psychological
testing and evaluation professionals.
The favorable answers to the following questions are
obvious to those of us in this country. Unfortunately, the
favorable responses may also be obvious to the individual
being questioned. This type of question should be avoided as
often as possible. Perhaps it is the simplicity of the
questi-n2 that is bothersome. It is quite possible that the
questi-ncn could be couched in terms so as not to appear so
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obvious. Also, a greater percentage of the questions should
be written in a negative context. This would preclude the
individual who simply answers in the affirmative from being
automatically classified as possessing wholehearted government
allegiance.
A. (1) Would you be willing to serve on the police
force of your community or village?
(2) Would you accept a position of responsibility
in your community or village if the government
requested you to do so?
(3) Are the insurgents, in your opinion, trying to
establish a good government?
B. (1) If you knew of an ambush planned by the
insurgents, would you warn the government
forces?
(2) If you knew that a member of your community or
village was working for the insurgents, would
you report him to the government?
(3) Would you report the location of an insurgent's
mine if you knew where it was?
(4) Would you be willing to serve on a government
intelligence net?
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C. (1) Have there been any pro-government meetings or
rallies in your community or village?
(2) Would you attend such a meeting or rally?
(3) If you could have either one, would you rather
read a government newspaper or an insurgent
newspaper?
D. (1) If you have/had children, would you like to
have them attend a school that was built and
sponsored by the government?
(2) Would you willingly help rebuild a school that
had been purposely destroyed or damaged by the
insurgents?
(3) Do yo think teachers should teach about and
support the government?
E. (1) Do you believe government supporters and
sympathizers are adequately protected from the
insurgents?
(2) In your opinion, are the government laws fair
and just for all?
(3) If you had a dispute with a neighbor, would you
go to the government police and courts for
settlement?
(4) Do you agree with the government policy of
severe punishment for those convicted of
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political, economic, or other crimes against
the security of the country?
F. (1) Who, in your opinion, is responsible for the
security and general well-being of your
community or village, the insurgents or the
government?
(2) If the insurgents destroyed the effects of a
civic program team, would you help to rebuild
it?
(3) Are the government teams or forces helping your
community or village build what you think needs
to be built?
G. (1) Do you feel safe whenever you must travel along
the roads or waterways?
(2) Who controls the roads and other transportation
means in the area, the government or the
insurgents?
(3) Are communications between communities or
villages adequate for your community's needs?
H. (I) Would you be willing to work with the
insurgency underground?
(2) Would you be unhappy if your son joined the
government armed forces?
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(3) If you were able to serve in the armed forces,
would you rather join the insurgent or the
government forces?
I. (1) To whom would you sell your manufactured or
agricultural products to if both the government
and the insurgents offered to buy for the same
price?
(2) Would you pay taxes to the insurgents if they
promised not to use force to collect them?
(3) Do you think it's unfair to have to pay taxes
to the government?
(4) Do you try to hide or find some way to avoid
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